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National Human Rights Institutions and the Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region 
By Andrew Wolman1 
 
Abstract 
In many countries across the Asia-Pacific region, national human rights institutions (NHRIs) 
have in recent years joined the courts as principal institutional loci for the implementation of 
international human rights norms at the domestic level.  This article investigates how the two 
institutions interact in the Asia-Pacific, and concludes that NHRIs exhibit several distinct types 
of interactions with the courts, namely collaboration; judicial training; participation in litigation; 
NHRI advocacy of better human rights practices and rulings by the courts; NHRI defense of 
judicial independence, and interactions related to NHRI adjudication of human rights petitions.  
This article argues that given the wide range of different interactions displayed, relatively 
simplistic characterisations of the optimal relationship between NHRIs and the courts as 
'cooperative' or 'supportive' are misguided, and that different types of interactions would benefit 
from different types of institutional relationships.  
 
 Introduction 
 In recent years, National Human Rights Institutions (‘NHRIs’) have assumed a role of 
increasing prominence in promoting and protecting human rights in the Asia-Pacific.  There are 
currently twenty NHRIs in the region, most of which are less than a decade old.2  Several other 
countries are actively considering establishing NHRIs.  Yet, there has been relatively little study 
of how these NHRIs interact with other institutions involved in implementing human rights 
protections in the region, such as the courts.  This article will address this issue by investigating 
the ways in which NHRIs and courts are currently interacting in the Asia-Pacific, attempting to 
categorise those interactions, and discussing the implications for developing appropriate 
relationships between NHRIs and the courts.   
 Background 
 NHRIs have been defined as ‘independent entities which have been established by a 
government under constitution or by law and entrusted specific responsibilities in terms of the 
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promotion and protection of human rights.’3  NHRIs in the Asia-Pacific tend to share a few 
significant characteristics: most notably, they are usually organised as national human rights 
commissions, instead of ombudsman, institutes, or advisory committees, which may have 
different traditions of interacting with the courts.  They also are generally mandated to 
investigate individual complaints and issue non-binding recommendations, which leads to more 
intensive contacts with the judiciary.  It should be stressed, however, that even within the Asia-
Pacific region the mandates, independence, size and power of NHRIs can vary considerably.   
Clearly, NHRIs share some of the same objectives as do the court systems, such as 
protecting human rights.  They also share some of the same methods (ie, handling complaints; 
encouraging conciliation and mediation; building norms).  The two institutions in many cases 
also share the same personnel - NHRI Commissioners are often picked from the judiciary, and in 
some cases are nominated or confirmed by the judiciary.   
There are also important distinctions, however.  NHRIs have a narrower substantive 
mandate - whether it includes all human rights or just certain ones such as non-discrimination - 
compared to the court system's general jurisdiction.  NHRIs have an explicit promotional 
mandate while courts have traditionally been far less involved with the promotion of human 
rights.  Courts have the ability to make binding decisions and order the enforcement of those 
decisions by State police power, while NHRIs can usually only make non-binding 
recommendations. 
 Interactions between NHRIs and the Courts 
 This section will explore the ways that NHRIs and the judiciary currently interact with 
each other in the Asia-Pacific region.  Specifically, this section will propose that we can now 
distinguish six conceptually distinct types of interaction in the region: collaboration; education; 
participation; challenge; defense, and the interactions (jurisprudential and case-specific) that 
arise in the course of an NHRI’s adjudication of individual complaints.   
A. NHRI collaboration with the courts 
Given the overlapping mandates of NHRIs and the courts, it is unsurprising that the two 
institutions have found a number of different ways to collaborate in their work.  Collaboration 
has occurred in two main contexts. 
First, NHRIs and judges have worked together to promote human rights to the general 
public.  Human rights promotion is an important task for both NHRIs and the judiciary.  The 
Paris Principles state that NHRIs shall ‘publicise human rights and efforts to combat all forms of 
discrimination, in particular racial discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially 
through information and education and by making use of all press organs’. 4   Meanwhile, 
according to the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, one of the 
objects and functions of the judiciary is to ‘promote, within the proper limits of the judicial 
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function, the observance and attainment of human rights.’5  Evidently, judges will differ in their 
view of the proper limits of the judicial function, depending on their jurisdiction and ideology.  
However, there are many judges in the Asia-Pacific who have engaged in collaborative activities, 
for example by participating in conferences or symposia held by the NHRI; appearing in public 
with NHRI Commissioners, and contributing to NHRI publications.   
Second, NHRIs have collaborated with judges to help research human rights issues, 
implement court decisions and monitor the implementation of court decisions.  This type of 
collaboration is specifically mandated for some, but not all, NHRIs.  In India, there have been a 
number of interesting examples of the National Human Rights Commission of India 
collaborating with the Supreme Court in the implementation of human rights judgments at the 
Court's request.  For example, in 1996, the Commission had just begun to study the right to food 
in the context of starvation deaths in Orissa when the Indian Supreme Court received a writ 
petition on the same issue.6  The Court responded by looking to the Indian NHRC for assistance, 
stating that ‘[i]n view of the fact that the NHRC is seized of the matter and is expected to give its 
report after an enquiry made at the spot, it would be appropriate to await the report.’7  Currently, 
the Indian NHRC is engaged in three activities on remit from the Indian Supreme Court, namely 
monitoring the implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act; overseeing the 
functioning of the mental hospitals at Ranchi, Agra, and Gwalior; and supervising the 
functioning of the Government Protective Home in Agra. 
B. Judicial Training and Education 
Human rights education is included in the mandate of almost all NHRIs.  Judicial training 
and education is properly seen as one aspect of an NHRI’s broader human rights education 
mandate, both because judges may not be well equipped to identify human rights problems, and 
because they may be unaware of developments in international human rights jurisprudence.  
According to the Nairobi Principles, the appropriate tasks of an NHRI include ‘[i]ncreasing 
awareness and knowledge by the judiciary of international human rights norms, standards and 
practices and related jurisprudence, including through training, seminars, study tours, or articles 
in professional legal publications[; e]ngaging with judicial educational bodies and professional 
legal training bodies[, and a]ssisting in the education of judges, lawyers, prosecutors and other 
judicial authorities (eg ensuring curricula reflect international human rights law)’.8   
Judicial training programs established by NHRIs (often in conjunction with other 
institutions) have been conducted in many countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  In Thailand, the 
National Human Rights Commission has been involved in educating judges on CEDAW and 
gender issues.  The National Human Rights Commission of India co-hosted a judicial training 
program on child sexual abuse and provides financial support and free publications to judicial 
training institutes.   The Australian Human Rights Commission has been involved in providing 
human rights training for Chinese judges under the aegis of the Australia Human Rights 
Technical Cooperation Program. 
C. Participation in the court system 
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In addition to collaborating with the courts and educating judges, NHRIs have the 
potential to further their mandate by actively participating in litigation.  In fact, while such 
participation is not ubiquitous, a growing number of Asia-Pacific NHRIs are able to participate 
in litigation in one way or another.9  Often, the NHRI’s mandate will provide broad leeway to 
participate in trials: one example of this is New Zealand, where the Human Rights Act 
specifically permits the Human Rights Commission to be appointed as an intervener; act as 
counsel assisting the court; or take part in court proceedings in another way permitted by its rules 
or regulations.10  For an NHRI, participation in trials brings with it the opportunity to access a 
coercive power that the NHRI lacks, but regular litigation can sometimes be unrealistic due to 
the expense and time commitment involved.   
Generally speaking there are four roles that NHRIs have adopted in court cases: 1) 
initiating court cases on their own behalf; 2) intervening in court cases in support of a private 
plaintiff; 3) submitting amicus briefs in cases without joining as a party and 4) providing 
assistance (legal or otherwise) to a party without joining as a party to the case.   
1. Initiating Cases  
Many Asia-Pacific NHRIs are able to themselves bring lawsuits in the courts.  According 
to Amnesty International, ‘NHRIs should have the legal power to bring legal cases to protect the 
rights of individuals or to promote changes in law and practice.’11  There are three distinct 
categories of cases that Asia-Pacific NHRIs have initiated so far: challenges to human rights 
abuses; petitions to enforce orders or recommendations, and claims for institutional protection. 
The most high-profile and controversial type of case is that which is brought by an NHRI 
with the objective of bringing a human rights violator to justice or ending some type of human 
rights violation.  One controversial example of an NHRI approaching the court on its own behalf 
is the Best Bakery massacre case.12  In this case, a state court acquitted several alleged 
perpetrators of a massacre during the 2002 sectarian violence in Gujarat despite strong evidence 
against them.  The National Human Rights Commission of India successfully challenged the 
acquittals in the Indian Supreme Court, leading to a retrial and convictions. 
Not all NHRIs have been given the power to file a case on behalf of a victim of human 
rights abuse. For example, one recent attempt by the Human Rights Commission of the Maldives 
to file suit regarding a human rights violation was rejected by the Maldives High Court, which 
ruled that the Commission was not entitled to file civil cases in its own name unless it is directly 
aggrieved.
13
  On the other hand, in Thailand, the 2007 constitution for the first time explicitly 
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gave the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand the ability to file lawsuits on behalf of 
victims of human rights abuses.
14
 
The second category of NHRI-initiated cases involve lawsuits that are filed with the 
objective of obtaining court-ordered enforcement or sanctions when the NHRI has issued an 
order (ie, to produce documents, attend a hearing, or submit testimony) or made a 
recommendation (often in response to an individual complaint) that was ignored or rejected by 
the party to whom the order or recommendation is made.  The Commonwealth Best Practice 
Guidelines promote the authorisation of this type of case, stating that ‘[t]here should be an 
expressly established mechanism for the enforcement of appropriate NHRI decisions by the 
courts.’15  One example of this type of lawsuit in India was the case of Shri Ram Singh, who was 
allegedly manhandled by police officers in Tamil Nadu. 16   The National Human Rights 
Commission of India had recommended that the State of Tamil Nadu pay Singh 5,000 Rupees, 
but the State refused to pay.  The Commission then petitioned the High Court of Madras to give 
appropriate directions to the State government.  The Court responded by ordering the payment of 
the original amount plus interest by the State government, along with an exemplary payment to 
the Commission itself. 
Finally, there are cases brought by an NHRI to preserve its own independence or 
effectiveness.  In Korea, the National Human Rights Commission recently turned to the 
constitutional court to challenge a proposal by the Ministry of Public Administration to downsize 
its bureaus from five to three and cut its staff from 208 to 164.17  Whether courts can effectively 
act as a protector for the independence of NHRIs depends on how the NHRI has been established 
(whether by constitution, statute, decree or other means), and the protections given to the NHRI, 
if any, in its founding document. 
2. Interventions 
Most Asia-Pacific NHRIs are also permitted to intervene on behalf of litigants in court 
proceedings.  For example, in Sri Lanka, the Human Rights Commission Act states that the 
Human Rights Commission may ‘intervene in any proceedings relating to the infringement or 
imminent infringement of the fundamental rights, pending before any court, with the permission 
of such court.’18   In Australia, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 
(‘HREOC’) has been particularly active in its court interventions, intervening in 59 cases 
between 1988 and 2009.19  The list of interventions has included some high profile cases, most 
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notable the Teoh case, which established that Australian administrative decision-makers were 
required to give effect to rights embodied in international human rights treaties. 20 
One of the barriers to interventions is the difficulty in becoming aware of pending cases. 
This issue has been a challenge in Korea, where the National Human Rights Commission 
initially lacked access to a list of human rights cases pending in the court system, leading to its 
failure to intervene in at least three important human rights cases during the first year of its 
existence.21  The National Human Rights Commission of India has in some cases become aware 
of pending cases from local media reports or by relying on information from a special rapporteur 
assigned to investigate a particulate an issue area.   
3. Amicus Curiae Brief Submissions  
 Another way that many NHRIs are able to affect the outcome of a pending lawsuit 
without actually becoming party to the suit is through the submission of an amicus curiae, or 
‘friend of the court’ brief.  Most but not all NHRIs have the power to submit amicus briefs.  The 
Australian HREOC has stated that it will file an amicus brief when ‘1) the Commissioner thinks 
the orders may affect to a significant extent the human rights of persons who are not parties to 
the proceedings; or 2) the proceedings, in the opinion of the Commissioner, have significant 
implications for the administration of the relevant Act/s; or 3) the proceedings involve special 
circumstances such that the Commissioner is satisfied that it would be in the public interest for 
the Commissioner to assist the Court as amicus.’22   
While NHRIs most often approach the court to ask permission to submit an amicus brief, 
in some circumstances the dynamic is reversed, and the court will ask the NHRI to submit an 
amicus brief on a particular issue.  For example, in Naushad Ali v the State, the Fijian High 
Court requested that the NHRI file an amicus brief on whether corporal punishment in prison 
was consistent with the Fijian Constitution’s prohibition of torture and other cruel or degrading 
treatment or punishment.23  
4. Provision of Advice and Assistance to Litigants  
NHRIs routinely provide victims of human rights violations that wish to access the courts 
with simple advice such as how or where to file a suit.  However, in some circumstances a higher 
level of assistance can be offered, including the provision of legal advice, the granting of money 
to hire a lawyer, or the provision of a referral of a lawyer willing to provide pro bono services.  
Sometimes this assistance mandate is explicitly provided for in the NHRI’s establishing 
legislation; for example, the Indonesian Human Rights Commission can ‘give recommendations 
to the parties for resolving conflict through the courts.’ 24   
D. Challenging human rights-unfriendly practices by the courts  
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One of the most fundamental tasks of NHRIs is to challenge the State when it engages in 
practices that violate human rights.  Thus, NHRIs generally have the task of challenging actions 
by the judiciary that are human rights violations or human rights-unfriendly.  Specifically, there 
are three aspects of judicial activity where NHRIs have advocated for human rights 
improvements.  First, NHRIs have challenged the courts’ procedural conduct of its judicial 
operations, including issues such as access to justice.  Second, NHRIs have challenged the 
courts’ rights jurisprudence, by advocating for more human rights-protective rulings.  And third, 
NHRIs have advocated better adherence to human rights by the courts in their non-judicial 
operations.  The means used by NHRIs to challenge court practices are similar to those used to 
influence other branches of government, and include writing reports; making public 
condemnations and issuing recommendations in response to individual complaints. 
1. Courtroom Procedure 
According to the Nairobi Declaration, NHRIs should promote ‘equal access to justice and 
assisting victims seeking redress with information on the law and the legal system particularly in 
relation to marginalised or vulnerable groups as well as migrants’.25  Asia-Pacific NHRIs have 
advocated for access to justice and human rights protection for victims on a number of occasions 
in Korea, India, Mongolia, and New Zealand.  In Southeast Asia, the four NHRIs from ASEAN 
states recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding pledging to work towards ensuring 
access to justice for trafficked women and children.26 
While access to justice issues have traditionally received the most attention, other 
elements of courtroom procedure have come in for increased scrutiny too in recent years.  In the 
Maldives, for example, the National Human Rights Commission condemned a court policy that 
required women to take off their veils when appearing in court as discriminatory against 
observant Muslim women.27  In Korea, the National Human Rights Commission has asserted the 
right to privacy for participants in judicial proceedings.28   
2. Jurisprudence 
NHRIs have influenced human rights jurisprudence through participation in litigation, as 
discussed earlier.  However, there are also ways to influence the outcome of court rulings absent 
direct participation.  For example, NHRIs have shown the ability to influence jurisprudence 
through issuing reports and guidelines that are later relied upon the courts.  In India, the National 
Human Rights Commission issued a set of guidelines on the treatment of cases of those who are 
mentally ill in jail which was quoted extensively by the Division Bench of the Indian High Court 
in one of its rulings.29  More recently, the Indian Supreme Court relied in part on a set of 
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National Human Rights Commission guidelines on the administration of lie detector tests for an 
important ruling.30 
One difficult question is whether NHRIs should be able to criticise or challenge a specific 
judicial ruling.  Generally, such criticism has been rejected as inappropriate.  In Korea, for 
example, the NHRCK has chosen not to criticise Constitutional Court decisions on the grounds 
that state agencies are legally bound by the decisions of the Constitutional Court.31  However, 
some human rights NGOs have characterised this reluctance as dereliction of duty, stating that 
because the Commission has the power to submit opinions to the Court, it is natural to criticise 
the Court when those opinions are ignored, and noting that the Commission is expected to speak 
for international human rights law as well as domestic law, so it may have a duty to criticise the 
Court in relation to human (rather than constitutional) rights.   
 One recent example of the difficulties that can arise from challenging a court decision 
was the case of Bani Kanta Das and Anr v State of Assam, where the National Human Rights 
Commission of India was reprimanded by the Supreme Court for asking the governor of Assam 
to grant clemency to an individual who had been sentenced to death for murdering four 
individuals.32  The Commission had advised the governor that capital punishment constituted a 
human rights violation.  The Indian Supreme Court strongly criticised the Commission’s 
intervention, stating that it had gone beyond its jurisdiction and was not permitted to hold that a 
court had violated human rights.   
3. Non-Judicial Activities 
The judiciary is not thought of as a branch of government that is particularly likely to 
violate human rights in its non-judicial activities.  However, there are a number of ways in which 
court systems can in fact affect human rights through their roles as employers, contractors, 
purchasers of goods, etc.  When abuses occur, they have been challenged by NHRIs.  For 
example, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea recently recommended that the 
Supreme Court improve human rights conditions of cleaning service employees in the Supreme 
Court building and address the issue of the employees’ low wages.33   
E. Defending the judiciary from challenges to its independence or 
effectiveness 
Another important role for NHRIs is to defend the judiciary from challenges to its 
independence or its ability to effectively protect rights.  According to the Nairobi Declaration, 
NHRIs should ‘[take] action where officials in the judiciary are faced by intimidation, threats or 
violence’.34   Asia-Pacific NHRIs have advocated for judicial independence on a number of 
occasions.  For example in response to criticisms of ‘judicial activism’ from some quarters, 
Commissioner Verma of India’s National Human Rights Commission vocally defended the 
practice, stating that ‘[j]udicial activism is a delicate exercise involving creativity. [...]  Judicial 
creativity is needed to fill the void occasioned by any gap in the law or inaction of any other 
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functionary, and, thereby, to implement the Rule of Law.’35  In 2004, members of a colloquium 
involving the human rights NGO Interrights, the Fiji Human Rights Commission and 
representative from the Fiji Judiciary issued the Suva Statement on the Principles of Judicial 
Independence and Access to Justice.  In Malaysia, SUHAKAM (the Malaysian NHRI) held a 
symposium in October 2009, promoting judicial independence.  
F. Adjudicatory Interactions 
In the Asia-Pacific region, the ability to investigate individual complaints is the norm for 
NHRIs: according to a recent study of twelve NHRIs in the region, all were mandated to 
investigate individual complaints.36   When it comes to the adjudication of human rights 
complaints, the relationship between courts and NHRIs is often characterised as parallel: each 
institution is involved in independently hearing complaints of human rights abuses in its separate 
sphere.37   However, the parallelism is not always complete: as discussed below, there are a 
number of potential intersections between the two systems. 
One example of an NHRI and judicial system coming into contact would be the handling 
of the same matter simultaneously by both an NHRI and a court.  This is generally seen as 
inappropriate.  According to the Commonwealth Best Practice Guide, ‘NHRIs should not 
commence investigations into matters already pending before the courts unless required as part 
of the duty of NHRIs to investigate systemic issues relating to equal protection under the law and 
access to justice.’38  It is perhaps less obvious whether a NHRI investigation should continue its 
investigation if a criminal or civil case on the same subject is commenced after the NHRI has 
already begun to hear a complaint.  In Korea, the National Human Rights Commission will 
transfer a case to the criminal investigation agency upon commencement of a criminal 
investigation.  However, it will retain investigatory rights over the case when the complainant 
brings a civil action or makes a petition to the Constitutional Court on the matter under 
investigation. 
Another possible intersection between the two systems occurs after the NHRI has 
completed its investigation and made its recommendation.  According to the Commonwealth 
Best Practice Guide, the ‘decisions of NHRIs should be subject to judicial review.’39  As a 
practical matter, when NHRIs only have the power to issue non-binding recommendations, there 
may be relatively little incentive for a party deemed guilty of a human rights violation to appeal 
an adverse recommendation (instead of simply ignoring it).  On the other hand, if a complainant 
is not satisfied with the recommendation of an NHRI then the question remains of whether the 
NHRI’s recommendation can be appealed in the courts (and if so, whether the factual elements 
of the NHRI investigation will be accepted by the court) or whether the underlying subject of the 
complaint can alternatively be tried de novo.  In some circumstances, the NHRI itself may 
recommend that the public prosecutor file a criminal case against an individual if its 
investigation has revealed abuses that are best dealt with by the criminal law.
 
  However, the final 
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decision on whether to prosecute will normally rest with the prosecutor’s office (although there 
may be considerable public pressure to follow the NHRI’s recommendation). 
Finally, the adjudicatory regimes of courts and NHRIs can intersect through their 
jurisprudence.  The National Human Rights Commission of India, for example, uses existing 
court jurisprudence to interpret constitutional (or human) rights in its own rulings.40  Conversely, 
courts can cite prior NHRI holdings in their own rulings, although the appropriateness of this 
will vary by jurisdiction.  There has been little research into NHRI jurisprudence and the degree 
to which it reflects or diverges from judicial rights jurisprudence, but theoretically, different 
rulings on a particular matter could lead to a confusing emergence of conflicting norms.     
 Discussion 
 Clearly, at least in the Asia-Pacific context, it would be inaccurate to view the court 
system and NHRIs as existing in isolation from each other.  On the contrary, the interactions 
between the two bodies are significant, complex, and multi-faceted.  Conceptually, the NHRI-
judiciary relationship can be broken down and viewed as composing a range of different types of 
interactions, which this article characterises as collaboration, education, participation, challenge, 
defense, and adjudicatory interactions. 
The wide range of interactions between courts and the judiciary in the Asia-Pacific region 
brings into question some of the conventional wisdom regarding the nature of the relationship 
between the two bodies. Observers have tended to promote close cooperation between the courts 
and NHRIs.  Thus, the Nairobi Declaration states that ‘the role of NHRIs with regard to courts is 
one of support and cooperation.’41  The Commonwealth Best Practice Guide for National Human 
Rights Institutions states that NHRIs should play a role complementary to that of courts, and 
NHRIs and courts should establish a cooperative working relationship.42  Another commentator 
states that ‘engagements by NHRI’s with the judiciary should be pursued at every opportunity … 
I offer the following suggestions: periodic meetings between groups of senior members of both 
institutions, even if the meetings are initially only for tea and pleasant conversation.’43  This 
article suggests that such advice may not always be appropriate, and that the type of relationship 
that an NHRI should cultivate with the judiciary will depend on the nature of the interaction that 
is occurring.   
 In the collaborative situations described above, cooperation and regular contact would 
presumably be beneficial.  Similarly, to the extent that NHRIs and the judiciary desire to create a 
uniform rights jurisprudence, frequent communication and cooperation would seem useful.  On 
the other hand, where the NHRI is a party to litigation before a court, close cooperation would be 
inappropriate.  In these circumstances, the NHRI should be treated on an equal basis as other 
                                                          
40 See, eg, Procedure with respect to complaints against Armed Forces: Disappearance of Mohammed Tayab Ali, 
who was last seen in the company of paramilitary forces (Case No 32/14/1999-2000) at 
http://nhrc.nic.in/armedforcescases.htm#no8 (citing Supreme Court in Union of India v Luithukla (Smt.) and Others, 
(1999) 9 SCC 273). 
41 Nairobi Declaration (note 8 above), para 21. 
42 Commonwealth Secretariat, (note 15 above), p 28. 
43 John von Doussa, ‘Introductory Address at National Human Rights Institutions and the Administration of Justice 
Round Table Conference’ (Copenhagen, 2003), available at 
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/speeches/speeches_president/2003/copenhagan.html. 
litigants.  This means, for example, that ex parte communications should be prohibited if that is 
the general rule in the relevant jurisdiction.   
The situation where the NHRI is challenging some aspect of judicial human rights 
performance presents another case where ‘support and cooperation’ does not adequately 
characterise the nature of the NHRI-judiciary relationship.  Here, the NHRI must maintain 
enough of a distance from the courts to be able to vigorously criticise and condemn poor human 
rights practices, even if the NHRI is supporting a particular court in other aspects of its work or 
sitting before it as a party to pending litigation.  Evidently, a particular judge may not take kindly 
to such criticism, but that should not prevent the NHRI from exercising its mandated duties. 
 Conclusion 
Increasingly NHRIs and the courts are emerging as two prominent pillars for the 
implementation of human rights protections in the Asia-Pacific.  Thus, the ways in which these 
two institutions interact has taken on greater importance.  While further study of this topic is 
needed, this article makes clear that the interactions between NHRIs and the judiciary are multi-
faceted and complex.  NHRIs do not exist in an entirely separate and parallel sphere than the 
courts.  At times – and perhaps at the same time – their interactions involves collaboration and 
challenge; protection and petition.  Thus, the relationship between the two bodies should be 
carefully managed in order to further the mutual goal of human rights protection while ensuring 
the independence of each institution. 
